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	The ‘science = technology + philosophy’ thesis is not my invention, moreover, I can not identify its author. In fact, I found it in somebody’s message sent as a contribution to a discussion that was continued in a so-called discussion list.​[1]​ According to my memory, the (now unknown) author of this contribution said: “as everybody knows science = technology + philosophy” – the statement was completely surprising to me – despite of my long practice in research and teaching philosophy of science. Later I identified the source of my astonishment: in the usual practice of philosophical reflections on the problems of science, of technology, and that of the philosophy in general almost every analysis is performed separately; they are presented by different scholars in different journals, in different traditions, often in different disciplines – without any serious reflections to the problems in other fields. In this way the disciplinary fields of traditional philosophy of science and philosophy of technology or even that of philosophy have also been separated effectively during the decades of (at least latent) dominance of the positivist meta-methodology in the intellectual activity. Accepting such a methodology it is almost impossible to analyze all of these fields together, to consider the possibility of their mutual interrelatedness.
	However, for the 60’s years of twentieth century, the positivist methodologies had lost their earlier intellectual power, and alternative methodologies had come into prominence. As an illustration, we can refer to the emergence of different trends of post-positivist philosophy of science, the formation of hermeneutic and constructivist views of science and technology, the gradual realization of postmodern conditions, and so on. In the course of this ideological rearrangement, such approaches to science and technology were intensively cultivated as sociology of knowledge, social constructivism, social epistemology, hermeneutics of science and technology, and in a parallel process the traditional areas and borders of reality (and also of its disciplinary matrix) were reinterpreted. From the position of a recently established discipline, called technoscience, science and technology are almost inseparable from each other, their most essential characteristics can be studied within the same ontological and epistemological universe. According to the popular view of postmodern cultural studies science and technology are only subordinated and hardly distinguished components of the culture of an age with very significant common features with and interactions with all the other cultural entities including social interests and values, philosophies, religions, art or even the popular elements of culture.
	In this intellectual environment it is a natural claim to consider the mutual interrelatedness of science, technology and philosophy, moreover, it seems to be an important and surprisingly fruitful analysis. As a small part of this project in this paper I will enumerate the most elementary aspects of the ‘science = technology + philosophy’ thesis and try to show some of their most important implications for science, technology and philosophy.


Versions of the thesis

	The thesis is a formal statement on the interrelatedness of science, technology and philosophy, which demands interpretation. Representing the relations of the components of the thesis by Venn-diagrams, science can be identified as the intersection of the sets of technology and philosophy. This is a little bit too “strong” interpretation of the formula, though its use can disclose two important relations: only certain elements of technology and philosophy are included into science and not their whole bodies; and science has a mixed identity. These are really fundamental characteristics of science, but for their further study a “weaker” interpretation of the formula would be enough: everything that is scientific includes something that is technological and philosophical.​[2]​ This weak, but more flexible interpretation will be applied in our analysis.
	Rearranging the formula we can create different versions of the thesis, in order to disclose and emphasize different aspects of the relationships of science, technology and philosophy. For example, if one would like to use the thesis to describe the characteristics of sciences, the “classical” version (science = technology + philosophy) is effective in disclosing science-technology relationships. The rearranged formula ‘science – technology = philosophy’ (science minus technology is equal to philosophy) is useful to study the ideological role of sciences, or to emphasize the role of philosophical principles in sciences. The other rearranged formula ‘science – philosophy = technology’ (science minus philosophy is equal to technology) is handy in the identification of the phenomena of ‘technicization’ of sciences or for the characterization of the so-called „applied” science. Using any versions of the formula, but following another goals, we can concentrate on the analysis of the nature of philosophy or technology. To save space, now we will essentially focus on the “classical” formula.


On the nature of science, technology and philosophy

	Taking a short glance at the history of European culture, we can get a historical argument for the thesis. Technologies are the oldest components of culture, philosophy and science emerged many thousands of years later, moreover, sciences have appeared only a few hundred years after the birth of philosophy. There were no sciences without effective technologies and existing philosophies.
	This consecutive sequence of cultural entities can be called the principle of “the primacy of technology”. In fact, the validity of the principle has its roots in the needs of primitive human beings to control their living environment for survival. An effective control over a situation – this is the essence of every technology. Making and using tools serve this goal. A kind of hermeneutics is the most essential tool-making praxis: artifacts are created by situation-bound (re)interpretation of natural beings. Any tool is a tool only in a given situation. Every version of technology from the primitive human techniques till our computer technology achieves the control of its situation with the support of a situation-bound knowledge; it is enough to know how the situation is controllable.
	Philosophy has a completely different nature. From its beginning, there have been discussions on the usefulness of philosophy. Indeed, philosophy is not useful in the determined control of situations, or even it is a source of uncertainty. Philosophy is devoted to explore, not to control the situations – to compare and explain them and to disclose ultimate truth. Making and using concepts serve this goal. Questioning, reflecting, critical thinking, a declared lack of certainty are the most essential practices for conceptual thinking: philosophical ideas are created by an endless process of thinking. A philosophical idea is a valid idea in a world. Every version of philosophy builds up worlds with the support of situation-free knowledge; it is necessary to know how and why the world has occurred from situations.
Science accepts, includes, uses, combines, cultivates and improves numerous aspects of the controversial natures of technology and philosophy. Science, compared to technology, is subordinated and usefulness in practice – compared to philosophy, is limited, restricted, and praxis-bound. Science includes situation-bound experiences and universal, world over principles and laws. Science does not build up and control real situations, but discovers and conceives conceptual systems. Because of its survival (or effectiveness) oriented attitude, technology prefers the present (hic et nunc) instead of the past and the future, the survival is a “here and now” solvable task, there is no meaning of postponement, while critical thinking and reflexivity have a space-time needs, they are definitely not “here and now” activities. Technology is finite, philosophy is infinite, only science evolves, or in other words: if technology is punctuated, then philosophy is a line, and science is a segment. Philosophy builds up worlds from technological situations for sciences. Scientific knowledge includes knowing how, knowing what and knowing why.
	There are many different ways of world-making in philosophy. Perhaps the Platonic way – a world-making by „justification” – is the most popular one. The Platonic knowledge is knowledge as justified true belief/opinion (doxa), that makes a clear connection and distinction between belief and knowledge. However, for our purpose it is better to accept the Aristotelian way of world-making, which is a world-making by „ inquire for causes”. The Aristotelian knowledge comes from knowing of causes. Knowing the contingent is being only knowing, but knowing the necessity yields to knowledge. Aristotle makes a connection and distinction between knowing (being acquainted) and knowledge. Moreover, in the Aristotelian world there are two types of knowledge: epistêmê vs. technê – as knowledge on things given by nature vs. knowledge on things created by craftsman, or, in other words: knowledge on natural vs. artificial beings.
	Based on the Aristotelian ideas and the principles, mentioned above, we can make a clear connection and distinction between technology and science. Technology is a human praxis based on an ability called “technê” (knowing, a situation-bound art of creation) in the ancient times, which is effective in given situations, and which is usually satisfied with knowing of contingent relationships. Exploiting its effective control, technology sustains artificial situations and creates artificial beings including cultures, social structures, personalities, artifacts, etc. Science is another human praxis based on an ability called “epistêmê” (knowledge, a situation-free art of consideration) by the ancient Greeks, which is valid in every situations, and which is usually satisfied with knowing of necessary (e.g. causal) relationships only. Enjoying its contemplative freedom, comparing so many given situations as it is available, science discovers the world of given (by nature, culture, society, etc.) beings, and creates necessarily interrelated conceptual systems to describe and explain the real world, including nature, culture, social and mental structures, etc. Because of the primacy of technology, it is possible to speak about the “natural” origin and toolkit of technology, but it is unclear: what is the source of the scientific activity, how could science differentiated from technology, how was able to break through from contingency to necessity, and so on. The very short answer is that all of these changes are based on the ancient technology-philosophy interactions. After a few hundred years the results of these interactions have been stabilized and a new cultural entity, science emerged. The organizing principles and the most fundamental characteristics of this entity had been maintained unchangeable, and we can summarize it shortly: ‘science = technology + philosophy’.




Table 1. A comparison of science and technology

Science	Technology
Beings are „given by nature”	Beings are artificial
„Epistêmê”	„Technê”
Necessary knowing (knowledge)	(Contingent) knowing
To know why	To know how
Abstract and universal laws	Concrete, unique rules
Situation-free truth	Situation-bound validity
Eternal and global	Temporal and local
Unified	Plural
Contemplative	Reasonable
Focus on reality	Focus on potentiality
Truth	Effectiveness
„Dezanthropomorphic”	„Anthropomorphic”
Created by a „philosopher”	Created by a „craftsman”


Some implications of the thesis

If technology and science differ from each other, or even opposite to each other in this numerous relations, then the question is: what is the meaning of the ‘science = technology + philosophy’ thesis, how can we explain their interconnectedness? Of course, philosophy links the two sides to each other. Different philosophies yields different sciences, so historical, social, personal variants of scientific disciplines, practices, methodologies, ideas, interpretations, etc. can be associated with the philosophical ideas and principles applied in the concrete cases. This is the very business of philosophy of science. Now we would like to mention just a few – almost evident – illustrative examples.
	A crucial methodological problem is: how can we create a world (for science) from the separated situations (of technology)? According to a naïve, but a popular philosophical world-construction the world is a simple collection of situations, i.e. world = situation(1) + situation(2) + …+ situation(n), where n is finite or infinite depending on our philosophical taste. It is unnecessary to say that there are so many more elaborated world-making methodologies in philosophy, but this simple version is enough to demonstrate the double nature of scientific experimentation. Scientists involved into scientific researches try to create new and new (called sometimes experimental) situations to check the validity of scientific knowledge, so the experiments have scientific (situation-free) goals but technological (situation-bound) character.
	Based on the thesis, the relation between the concepts of scientific models and theories can be described in an easy way: ‘model + philosophy = theory’ i.e. a theory is a situation-free model, which is created by philosophically motivated interpretation.
The relation of knowledge and power is a very important question in every age. From our position, the Baconian idea “knowledge is power” has a specific meaning, namely, that in the modern age science has a highly technological and hierarchical characteristics. Technology is familiar with power, science is not, it is a contemplative and democratic (e.g. democracy of situations) practice. Similar problems have an important role in the modern-postmodern transition and its descriptions by Heidegger, Habermas, Lyotard and others.
	Besides the regular scientific reflection (dealing with the subject-field of the discipline), it is possible to identify a different kind of reflection (focus on the scientific activity itself), which is presented at a different-, a meta-level. For example: it is a possible task to study the methodological problems of sciences, e.g. what is the technology of making good science? On the meta-level analyses we can also differentiate, and can speak about meta-technology, meta-philosophy and meta-science, and of course, about their (same as in the subject-level) interrelatedness. However, recent trends in philosophy of science and technology, technoscience, science studies, etc. combine the elements of technological, philosophical and scientific meta-reflections in various ways – often without any conscious reflection. (The number of reflection-levels is infinite in principle – but this is not the case in the philosophical praxis.) Reaching a balanced position between these constituents of meta-culture is an important source of debates within philosophy of science and related disciplines.
	Finally we would like to mention one or two implications of the rearranged versions of the thesis. There are many forms of „technicization” of sciences, which is based on disregarding or eliminating the philosophical constituent of sciences. There is a “weaker” methodology also: preference to epistemology instead of ontology as a philosophical tool. As a possible motivation of technicization, a need for an ideology-free science can be identified. (Of course, there are no such an animal according to this thesis.) On the other hand, the fragmented world of the postmodern age yields to a postmodern science, which is a very technicized one, like to computer and information science/technology.
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^1	  Unfortunately, I can not remember the names of discussers and their topic. I suppose the discussion was passed off in 1999 probably on the HOPOS-L-, technology-, sts, or philosop list or on something like those. I was not able to find the statement in my archives of these lists.
^2	  Here we apply Aristotle’s method: “For the word 'nature' is applied to what is according to nature and the natural in the same way …” (Physics, 193a31)
^3	  There is no room to follow the details of the references – so I just enumerate the most significant works I have used.
